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THE RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN INTERSTATE
TRANSPORTATION, ETC.
By Frederick H. Cooke, of the New York Bar.
There can be, generally speaking, no doubt of the existence of
a right to engage in transportation, whether of persons or of prop-
perty, from State to State. The doctrine seemingly established
in the Supreme Court is that the basis of such right is the com-
merce clause of the Federal Constitution, by which Congress is
empowered to regulate commerce "among the several States",'
"the absence of any law of Congress on the subject" being
regarded as "equivalent to its declaration that commerce in that
matter shall be free".2 We submit that a more satisfactoiy view
is that such right exists independently of the commerce clause,
either as a "natural" "inalienable" right, or as secured against
governmental interference by other constitutional provisions, in
particular, the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments, to say
nothing of numerous provisions in State constitutions. But, for
present purposes, it is unnecessary to dwell on this aspect of the
matter. Nor need we here consider such obvious qualifications
of such right as are illustrated by quarantine regulations and pro-
visions, designed to prevent fraud and deception.
We are here to consider such right of transportation from State
to State as existing under conditions of special privilege. . But
first let us consider it as existing in the absence of such condi-
tions, what we call the bald right of transportation. This requires
but little consideration, and may easily be illustrated. A peddler
with his pack enjoys the right of transportation, of person and of
property, between points say in the State of Ohio. Nor is there
any difference manifest in this regard when he crosses the State
line into Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Kentucky, Indiana, or
Michigan. And so as to a farmer driving his wagon laden with
produce.
' For the sake of additional clearness this discussion does not specific-
ally include "commerce with foreign nations," though largely applicable
thereto.
- 2 Bowntan v. Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 125 U. S., 465, 508 (1888); see
also Oklahoma v, Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U. S., 229, 261 (1911).
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But note carefully that we have thus far supposed that neither
the peddler nor the farmer asks or receives for the purpose of such
transportation any special privilege granted by governmental
-authority. The complex conditions of our modern civilization
soon bring in the necessity for such privileges. Let us consider
the case of the Ohio farmer.
The business of transporting produce from the Ohio farm, say
to Pittsburg, Wheeling, Louisville, Indianapolis, or Detroit, has
now become so extensive that the farm wagon no longer suffices.
For purely land transportation the farmer makes use of a rail-
road, whether owned and operated by him or (as is practically
always the case) by others, is immaterial, so far as we are here
concerned. But the construction and operation of a railroad com-
monly, even if not necessarily, requires the obtaining of special
privilege or privileges from some governmental authority. To
say nothing of the numerous and complex privileges involved in
the creation of a corporation, there is now required the grant of
the privilege of eminent domain.
Or suppose the farmer to be engaged in transporting his pro-
duce into Kentucky or West Virginia, States separated from Ohio
by a navigable river. In the absence of suitable bridges, the use
of a vessel now becomes necessary, though, indeed, this does not,
necessarily at least, involve the grant of any special privilege. But
suppose that our farmer, or, for that matter, any one else, having
vessels suitable for transportation of persons or property across
the Ohio River into Kentucky or West Virginia, desires to make
them profitable by carrying for hire. Neither here is there neces-
sarily involved the grant of any special privilege. But those trans-
porting under these conditions commonly find it desirable that
they be granted the right of landing at certain points, or that
others be excluded from transporting between certain points; in
other words, that there be obtained an exclusive ferry privilege
or franchise of transporting between such points.
Having thus endeavored to make plain the distinction between
the bald right of transportation from State to State (generally
speaking, unquestionable) and such transportation under condi-
tions of special privilege, it is now to be considered whether there
is likewise under any conditibn a like right of such transporta-
tion under conditions of special privilege: whether, if it exists at
all, there are any limitations, and if so, what.
But before considering the particular case of transportation
from State to State, let us consider some other cases, thus manu-
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facture and sale. Now, subject to qualifications already stated, it
may be broadly asserted that there exists an absolute right of
manufacture and sale within the territorial limits of a given State,
whether existing as a "natural" "inalienable" right, or as secured-
by say the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, to say nothing of
numerous provisions in State constitutions. But is there any such
absolute right of manufacture and sale, under conditions of special
privilege? Can those engaged therein insist upon being clothed
with the privileges of a corporation or, having been so clothed,
insist upon the right to have such privileges continued? Can they
insist upon being allowed the privilege of eminent domain? Clearly
not, as a general rule. The point does not require elaboration.
Yet obvious as it is, it seems to have been persistently over-
looked or ignored by the Supreme Court in its application to trans-
portation from State to State: that is, the court has overlooked
or ignored the distinction between the bald right of transportation
and transportation under conditions of special privilege. The
opinions contain little discussion of the topic, but that in Crutcher
v. Kentucky 3 contains the following language: "If a partnership
firm of individuals should undertake to carry on the business of
interstate commerce between Kentucky and other States, it would
not be within the province of the State legislature to exact condi-
tions on which they should carry on their business, nor to require
them to take out a license therefor. To carry on interstate com-
merce is not a franchise or a privilege granted by the State; it
is a right which every citizen of the United States is entitled to
exercise under the Constitution and laws of the United States;
and the accession of nere corporate facilities, as a matter of con-
venience in carrying on their business, cannot have the effect of
depriving them of such right." Illuitrations of this attitude of
the court will presently be furnished.
The case of corporate privileges seems, then, to justify us in
asserting (as a matter of authority) that there exists, to an extent
at least, an absolute right of transportation from State to State,
that is something more than a bald right of transportation, being
the right of transportation under conditions of special privilege.
But it scarcely needs pointing out that there has not yet been
recognized the existence of an absolute right of transportation
from State to State under any and all conditions of special privi-
lege. A limitation or limitations must exist somewhere. The dis-
3141 U. S., 47, 57 (1891).
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covery thereof may be assisted by a consideration of what are
not corporate privileges, strictly considered, not, at any rate, as
the expression is commonly understood. The most conspicuous
instance is the privilege of eminent domain.
Most lawyers would doubtless be considerably surprised at an
intimation that there is any doubt of the soundness of the proposi-
tion that a foreign corporation, railroad or other, may, under any
conditions, without the permission or against the will of a State,
exercise the privilege of eminent domain within its territory. And,
as a matter of authority, this proposition does seem fairly well
established, even as applied to a corporation engaged in interstate
transportation. Indeed the point seems to have usually been
regarded as too obvious to require extended discussion.4
But it is here to be considered whether, after all, this conclusion
is to be readily accepted without qualification. It is cer-
tainly well established, as a general rule, that it is beyond
the power of a State to impose restrictions upon inter-
state transportation by a foreign corporation. And the rule has
been extended to what is not, strictly speaking, transportation, but
merely incidental thereto,' Now is not the exercise of the privi-
lege of eminent domain so incidental to transportation by railroad
that it is beyond the power of a State to impose restrictions upon
the exercise thereof by a foreign corporation, engaged in inter-
state transportation by railroad?
In Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co." it was held
beyond the power of a State to impose restrictions upon the con-
struction of an interstate telegraph line, but it was regarded as
unnecessary to determine whether this included the privilege of
eminent domain. In Western Union Tel. Co. v. Superior Court,'
- See, for instance, Evansville & Henderson Traction Co. v. Hender-
son Bridge Co., 141 Fed., 51 (C. C. A. 6th C., 1905). So a fortiori as to
a domestic corporation. See, for instance, Northwestern Tel. Co. v. City
of St. Charles, 154 Fed., 386 (C. C. Minn., 1907). See also Lewison Eminent
Domain, 3d ed., §374; Beale on Foreign Corporations, §115.
5 Thus in Norfolk & Western R. R. Co. si. Pennsylvania, 136 U. S.,
114 (1890), was held invalid the imposition of a license tax upon a rail-
road corporation, on account of having an office that was maintained
solely because of the interstate business of the corporation. Clearly keep-
ing an office is not of itself transportation.
696 U. S., 1 (Oct., 1877). To like effect, Western Uniohn Tel. Co. v.
Ann Arbor R. R. Co., 178 U. S., 239 (1900) ; Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 195 U. S., 540 (1904).
115 Pac. 1091 (Cal Dist. Ct. of App., 1911).
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however, the right of a telegraph corporation engaged in inter-
state transportation to exercise such privilege was clearly recog-
nized, even on the assumption that it was the intention of the leg-
islature to exclude it from such right. The Court said: "It may
be declared as a matter of common knowledge that the right in
telegraph or other corporation organized for cognate purposes
to exercise the power of eminent domain is absolutely, indeed,
indispensably essential to the carrying on of their business, for
obviously, without such right, they could very easily be prevented
from doing business at all." Is not this fairly obvious? This
conclusion was, indeed, largely based on congressional legislation
regarded as referable to the power to establish post roads.8 But
it seems an easy step therefrom to the conclusion that such right
may with equal reason be regarded as based on the commerce
clause.
But, however, it may be as to the privilege of eminent domain,
the existence of a right that seems closely analogous thereto was
clearly established in Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co;"
Haskell v. Cowham.'0 Here" it was held beyond the power of
a State to forbid to a corporation engaged in interstate transpor-
tation of natural gas, the use of pipe lines, though the construction
thereof involved the crossing of the highways of the State. It
was said in one of the opinions: "The only practicable method of
transporting natural gas is by a pipe line, and the prohibition of
the use of a pipe line for that purpose is in effect a prevention of
its transportation." And there was overruled the contention thus
stated: "The State owns the highways, hence it has the power to
withhold from all the privilege of laying and operating pipes
across the lines of these highways beneath their surface for the
purpose of transporting natural gas, or any other articles of inter-
state commerce."
. Reference has already been made to interstate transportation
by water, thus, by ferry, across a river or other water separating
States. It seems established that a State may grant an exclusive
8 For present purposes, it seems unnecessary to consider whether,
merely as a matter of statutory construction, this decision can be recon-
ciled with Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., and other
decisions of the Supreme Court to the same effect.
9221 U. S., 229 (1911).
10 187 Fed., 403 (C. C. A. 8th C., 1911).
11 That is, in Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co. In Haskell v.
Cowham, the restriction was upon an individual.
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ferry franchise for the purpose of transportation into another
State.12 But it does not follow that, save as a matter of comity,
the grant can operate in another State, so as to, for instance, give
an exclusive right to land, or to transport from the shore therein.
Indeed, so far as the authorities go they seem opposed to the
existence of any such right.13 Yet, if it once be granted that such
exclusive right to land in or transport from another State is a
reasonably necessary incident of the concededly valid exclusive
ferry franchise, it may be difficult to avoid the conclusion that
there is such exclusive right. Questions of difficulty might, how-
ever, arise out of conflicting grants from different States.
On the whole, it would scarcely seem that the limits of the
doctrine of the right to engage in interstate transportation under
conditions of special privilege have been clearly established,
though so far as they have been, the test would seem to be whether
the possession of such privilege is in any particular case, reason-
ably necessary to the exercise of the right to engage in such trans-
portation.
The subject of interstate transportation, under conditions of
special privilege is much complicated by the circumstance that
there are two recognized sources of such special privilege, the
State and the Federal governments. Thus it is established that
either Congress or a State legislature may create a corporation
with authority to engage in interstate transportation. With refer-
ence to interference with such transportation under governmental
authority, we obviously have four distinct classes of cases: (i)
interference by a State, where the grant of special privilege is by
a State; (2) by Congress, where the grant is by a State; (3) by
a State, where the grant is by Congress; (4) by Congress, where
the grant is by Congress.
(i) Interference by a State, where the grant of special privi-
lege is by a State. It should be obvious, we submit, that, so far
at any rate, as the commerce clause is concerned, it is within the
power of the State to withdraw such privilege entirely, or to pre-
scribe the conditions under which it may be exercised. Yet the
decisions of the Supreme-Court do not support this view, the
reason being, as it seems to us, failure to distinguish between the
bald right to engage in interstate transportation and the right to
12 See Conway v. Taylor, 1 Black., 603 (Dec. 7, 1861).
13 See Weld v. Chapman, 2 Iowa, 524 (1856) ; Burlington & Hender-
son County Ferry Co. v. Davis, 48 Iowa, 133 (1878).
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so engage under conditions of special privilege. Having reached
the conclusion that, in the former case, it is, as a rule, beyond the
power of a State to impose restrictions, the same rule was, with-
out discrimination, applied to transportation under conditions of
special privilege granted to the State itself. This fallacious con-
clusion 4 underlies Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Ry. Co. v.
Illinois,"5 where, in the case of a domestic corporation, the regula-
tion of rates for interstate transportation was held invalid. The
same is true of Philadelphia & Southern Steamship Co. v. Penn-
sylvania, 6 a case of taxation of the gross receipts of a" domestic
corporation. And the same fallacy has been applied to foreign
corporations, as so recently illustrated by a decision that we have
just considered, Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co..7
(2) Interference by Congress, where the grant of special
privilege is by a State. It seems beyond doubt that the bald right
of interstate transportation is, as a rule, secured against interfer-
ence by Congress, if not as a matter of natural, inalienable right,
then by the Fifth Amendment, which has been said to forbid "a
regulation of interstate commerce, not merely affecting the mode
or manner of transportation, but excluding from interstate trans-
portation altogether certain classes of persons, or imposing con-
ditions on such transportation as would wantonly and arbitrarily
affect personal liberty."' 8 But is the same true of such transpor-
tation under conditions of special privilege granted by a State?
It seems difficult to see why it is not, if we once admit, as indeed
we must, as a matter of authority that it is within the power of a
State to grant such special privilege. To take a concrete case,
may Congress, either absolutely prohibit interstate transportation
by a corporation created by a State, or require it to perform a
condition such as the payment of a license fee, before engaging
therein? Leaving out of consideration the exercise of the taxing
power, pure and simple1' we submit that, speaking generally, such
14 The fallacy has not been altogether overlooked in the decisions. See
very pertinent observations in State v. C. N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co., 47 Ohio
St., 130 (1890). See also Railroad Co. v. Maryland, 21 Wall. (U. S.), 456,
471, (1874) and dissenting opinion in Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Ry. Co.
v. Illinois; also argument of Counsel in State Freight Tax Case, 15 Wall
(U. S.), 232, 264 (Dec. 1872).
is 118 U. S., 557 (1886).
16 122 U. S., 326 (1887).
17 Supra.
1s U. S. v. Delaware & H. Co., 164 Fed., 215, 231 (C. C. Pa., 1908).
19 See Flint v. Stone, Tracy Co., 220 U. S., 107 (1911).
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interference is beyond the power of Congress. But the contrary
view that Congress has such power under the commerce clause
has been conspicuously advocated.20 It remains for the-Supreme
Court to settle the point.
.(3) Interference by a State, where the grant is by Congress.
It seems clear that such interference is, as a rule, beyond the
power of a State, thus, as to interference with interstate transpor-
tation by a corporation deriving authority from Congress. West-
ern Union Tel. Co. v. Superior Court2 1 suggests that this is even
true of the exercise of the power of eminent domain.
(4) Interference by Congress where the grant is by Congress.
This point requires little consideration. Doubtless there exists,
generally speaking, such power of interference, though under cer-
tain conditions there may be limitations imposed by the Fifth
Amendment.
Frederick H. Cooke.
20 See in 3 Mich. Law Rev., 264 (1905), discussion by H. L. Wilgus
of the recommendation by Mr. Garfield as Commissioner of Corporations.
21 S"Pra.
